Abstract. We present a computationally secure MPC protocol for threshold adversaries which is parametrized by a value L. When L = 2 we obtain a classical form of MPC protocol in which interaction is required for multiplications, as L increases interaction is reduced in that one requires interaction only after computing a higher degree function. When L approaches infinity one obtains the FHE based protocol of Gentry, which requires no interaction. Thus one can trade communication for computation in a simple way. Our protocol is based on an interactive protocol for "bootstrapping" a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. The key contribution is that our presented protocol is highly communication efficient enabling us to obtain reduced communication when compared to traditional MPC protocols for relatively small values of L.
Introduction
In the last few years computing on encrypting data via either Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) or Multi-Party Computation (MPC) has been subject to a remarkable number of improvements. Firstly, FHE was shown to be possible [29] ; and this was quickly followed by a variety of applications and performance improvements [8, 11, 10, 26, 27, 37, 38] . Secondly, whilst MPC has been around for over thirty years, only in the last few years we have seen an increased emphasis on practical instantiations; with some very impressive results [7, 16, 35] .
We focus on MPC where n parties wish to compute a function on their respective inputs. Whilst the computational overhead of MPC protocols, compared to computing "in the clear", is relatively small (for example in practical protocols such as [23, 35] a small constant multiple of the "in the clear" cost), the main restriction on practical deployment of MPC is the communication cost. Even for protocols in the preprocessing model, the communication cost in terms of number of bits per multiplication gate and per party is a constant multiple of the bit length log p of the data being manipulated for a typically large value of the constant. This is a major drawback of MPC protocols since communication is generally more expensive than computation. Theoretical results like [21] (for the computational case) and [20] (for the information theoretic case) brings down the per gate per party communication cost to a very small quantity; essentially O( log n n · log |C| · log p) bits for a circuit C of size |C|. While these results suggest that the communication cost can be asymptotically brought down to a constant for large n, the constants are known to be large for any practical purpose. Our interest lies in constructing efficient MPC protocols where the efficiency is measured in terms of exact complexity rather than the asymptotic complexity.
In his thesis, Gentry [28] showed how FHE can be used to reduce the communication cost of MPC down to virtually zero for any number of parties. In Gentry's MPC protocol all parties encrypt to each other, their input under a shared FHE public key. They then compute the function homomorphically, and at the end perform a shared decryption. This implies an MPC protocol whose communication is limited to a function of the input and output sizes, and not to the complexity of the circuit. However, this reduction in communication complexity comes at a cost, namely the huge expense of evaluating homomorphically the function. With current understanding of FHE technology, this solution is completely infeasible in practice.
bootstrapping protocol can be found as a sub-procedure of the MPC protocol in [23] . We extract the required protocol, generalise it, and then apply it to our MPC situation.
To ease exposition we will not utilize the packing from [26] to perform such evaluations; we see this as a computational optimization which is orthogonal to the issues we will explore in this paper. In any practical instantiation of the protocol of this paper such a packing could be used, as described in [26] , in evaluating the multiplicative circuit of depth L. However, we will use this packing to perform the bootstrapping in a communication efficient manner.
The bootstrapping protocol runs in two phases. In the first (offline) phase we repeatedly generate sets of ciphertexts, one set for each party, such that all parties learn the ciphertexts but only the given party learns their underlying messages (which are assumed to be packed). The offline phase can be run in either a passive, covert or active security model, irrespective of the underlying access structure of the MPC protocol following ideas from [16] . In the second (online) phase the data to be bootstrapped is packed together, a random mask is added (computed from the offline phase data), a distributed decryption protocol is executed to obtain the masked data which is then re-encrypted, the mask is subtracted and then the data is unpacked. All these steps are relatively efficient, with communication only being required for the distributed decryption.
To apply our interactive bootstrapping method efficiently we need to make a mild assumption on the circuit being evaluated; this is similar to the assumptions used in [20, 21, 24] . The assumption can be intuitively seen as saying that the circuit is relatively wide enough to enable packing of enough values which need to be bootstrapped at each respective level. We expect that most circuits in practice will satisfy our assumption, and we will call the circuits which satisfy our requirement "well formed".
We pause to note that the ability to open data within the MPC protocol enables one to perform more than a simple evaluation of an arithmetic circuit. This observation is well known in the MPC community, where it has been used to obtain efficient protocols for higher level functions [13, 19] . Thus enabling a distributed bootstrapping also enables one to produce more efficient protocols than a purely FHE based one.
We instantiate our protocol with the BGV scheme [9] and obtain sufficient parameter sizes following the methodology in [27, 16] . Due to the way we utilize the BGV scheme we need to restrict to MPC protocols defined over arithmetic circuits over a finite field F p , with p ≡ 1 (mod m) with m = 2 · N and N = 2 r for some r.
We show that even for a very small value of L, in particular L = 5, we can achieve better communication efficiency than many practical MPC protocols in the preprocessing model. Most practical MPC protocols such as [7, 23, 35] require the transmission of at least two finite field elements per multiplication gate between each pair of parties. In [23] a technique is presented which can reduce this to the transmission of an average of three field elements per multiplication gate per party (and not per pair of parties). Note the models in [7] (three party, one passive adversary) and [23, 35] (n party, dishonest majority, active security) are different from ours (we assume honest majority, active security); but even mapping these protocols to our setting of n party honest majority would result in the same communication characteristics. We show that for relatively small values of L, i.e. L > 8, one can obtain a communication efficiency of less than one field element per gate and party (details available in Section 6).
Clearly, by setting L appropriately one can obtain a communication efficiency which improves upon that in [20, 21] ; albeit we are only interested in communication in the online phase of a protocol in the preprocessing model whilst [20, 21] discuss total communication cost over all phases. But we stress this is not in itself interesting, as Gentry's FHE based protocol can beat the communication efficiency of [20, 21] in any case. What is interesting is that we can beat the communication efficiency of the online phase of practical MPC protocols, with very small values of L indeed. Thus the protocol in this paper may provide a practical tradeoff between existing MPC protocols (which consume high bandwidth) and FHE based protocols (which require huge computation).
Our protocol therefore enables the following use-case: it is known that SHE schemes only become prohibitively computationally expensive for large L; indeed one of the reasons why the protocols in [23, 16] are so efficient is that they restrict to evaluating homomorphically circuits of multiplicative depth one. With our protocol parties can a priori decide the value of L, for a value which enables them to produce a computationally efficient SHE scheme. Then they can execute an MPC protocol with communication costs reduced by effectively a factor of L. Over time as SHE technology improves the value of L can be increased and we can obtain Gentry's original protocol. Thus our methodology enables us to interpolate between the case of standard MPC and the eventual goal of MPC with almost zero communication costs.
Well Formed Circuits
In this section we define what we mean by well formed circuits, and the pre-processing which we require on our circuits. We take as given an arithmetic circuit C defined over a finite field F p . In particular the circuit C is a directed acyclic graph consisting of edges made up of n I input wires, n O output wires, and n W internal wires, plus a set of nodes being given by a set of gates G. The gates are divided into sets of Add gates G A and Mult gates G M , with G = G A ∪ G M , with each Add/Mult gate taking two wires (or a constant value in F p ) as input and producing one wire as output. The circuit is such that all input wires are open on their input ends, and all output wires are open on their output ends, with the internal wires being connected on both ends. We let the depth of the circuit d be the length of the maximum path from an input wire to an output wire. Our definition of a well formed circuit is parametrized by two positive integer values N and L.
We now associate inductively to each wire in the circuit an integer valued label as follows. The input wires are given the label one; then all other wires are given a label according to the following rule (where we assume a constant input to a gate has label L)
Label of output wire of Add gate = min(Label of input wires), Label of output wire of Mult gate = min(Label of input wires) − 1.
Thus the minimum value of a label is 1 − d (which is negative for a general d). Looking ahead, the reason for starting with an input label of one is when we match this up with our MPC protocol this will result in low communication complexity for the input stage of the computation.
We now augment the circuit, to produce a new circuit C aug which will have labels in the range [1, . . . , L], by adding in some special gates which we will call Refresh gates; the set of such gates are denoted as G R . A Refresh gate takes as input a maximum of N wires, and produces as output an exact copy of the specified input wires. The input requirement is that the input wires must have label in the range [1, . . . , L], and all that the Refresh gate does is relabel the labels of the gate's input wires to be L. At the end of the augmentation process we require the invariant that all wire labels in C aug are then in the range [1, . . . , L], and the circuit is now essentially a collection of "sub-circuits" of multiplicative depth at most L − 1 glued together using Refresh gates. However, we require that this is done with as small a number of Refresh gates as possible.
Definition 1 (Well Formed Circuit).
A circuit C will be called well formed if the number of Refresh gates in the associated augmented circuit C aug is atmost
We expect that "most" circuits will be well formed due to the following argument: We first note that the only gates which concern us are multiplication gates; so without loss of generality we consider a circuit C consisting only of multiplication gates. The circuit has d layers, and let the width of C (i.e. the number of gates) at layer i be w i . Consider the algorithm to produce C aug which considers each layer in turn, from i = 1 to d and adds Refresh gates where needed. When reaching level i in our algorithm to produce C aug we can therefore assume (by induction) that all input wires at this layer have labels in the range [1, . . . , L].
To maintain the invariant we only need to apply a Refresh operation to those input wires which have label one. Let p i denote the proportion of wires at layer i which have label one when we perform this process.
It is clear that the number of required Refresh gates which we will add into C aug at level i will be at most 2 · p i · w i /N , where the factor of two comes from the fact that each multiplication gate has two input wires.
Assuming a large enough circuit we can assume for most layers that this proportion p i will be approximately 1/L. So summing up over all levels, the expected number of Refresh gates in C aug will be:
Note, we would expect that for most circuits this upper bound on the number of Refresh gates could be easily met. For example our above rough analysis did not take into account the presence of gates with fanout greater than one (meaning there are less wires to Refresh than we estimated above), nor did it take into account utilizing unused slots in the Refresh gates to refresh wires with labels not equal to one. Determining an optimum algorithm for moving from C to a suitable C aug , with a minimal number of Refresh gates, is an interesting optimization problem which we leave as an open problem; however clearly the above outlined greedy algorithm will work for most circuits.
Threshold L-Levelled Packed Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE)
Here we summarize the properties we need from our (abstract) underlying SHE scheme. In Appendix A we shall formally expand on the following high level intuition. The scheme will be parametrized by a number of values; namely the security parameter κ, the number of levels L and the amount of packing of plaintext elements which can be made into one ciphertext N . In practice the parameter N will be a function of the number of levels L and the security parameter κ. The message space of the SHE scheme is defined to be M = F N p , and we embed the finite field F p into M via a map χ : F p −→ M. See Appendix B for a discussion as to the various choices one has for χ when we specialise to the BGV SHE scheme.
Ciphertexts c in our scheme will have associated to them a level l, so in what follows we shall describe ciphertexts as a pair (c, l) which defines the ciphertext and the associated level l ∈ [0, . . . , L] which it is at. The SHE scheme supports the following usual operations:
1. SHE.KeyGen(1 κ ): it produces a public/private key pair (pk, sk), and an evaluation key ek. 2. SHE.Enc pk (m, r): it takes a plaintext m and randomness r, and produces a ciphertext (c, L) at level L. 3. SHE.Dec sk (c, l): it decrypts c to obtain a plaintext m. We say that m is the plaintext associated with c.
This function homomorphically evaluates the arithmetic circuit C, which is a circuit of multiplicative depth at most L, in an SIMD manner producing the output (ĉ 1 , l out 1 ), . . . , (ĉ out , l out out ). The procedure SHE.Eval is obtained by evaluating the arithmetic circuit C via the use of the sub-procedures:
In addition we require the following three operations: , l) , . . . , (c N , l) such that c i has associated plaintext χ(m i ). 3. SHE.LowerLevel ek ((c, l), l ): This procedure, for l < l, produces a ciphertext with the same associated plaintext as of (c, l) but at level l .
To support threshold decryption we need to modify the key generation algorithm and present additional algorithms for our scheme. The key difference is that the key generation algorithm takes (n, t) as additional input (which defines the threshold properties of our scheme), along with the statistical security parameter sec (for the security of the distributed decryption) and outputs a set of keys (dk 1 , . . . , dk n ) for the distributed decryption, one for each party, in addition to the public key, secret key and the evaluation key. The keys for the distributed decryption satisfy the property that given t (or less) such keys no information about the secret key sk can be obtained, while any set of t + 1 or more of such keys are sufficient to recover the secret key in the information theoretic sense. This allows us to define the following three additional algorithms:
Given a ciphertext c and a key dk i for the distributed decryption, this algorithm computes a decryption shareμ i of c. 2. SHE.ShareCombine((c, l), {μ i } i∈[1,...,n] ): Given a ciphertext c and any set of t + 1 or more (correct) decryption sharesμ i corresponding to c, anyone can combine them (using this algorithm) to obtain a plaintext m. We require that the output m of SHE.ShareCombine should be the same as would have been obtained by applying the decryption algorithm SHE.Dec sk on c. 3. SHE.ShareSim((c, l), m, I, {μ i } i∈I ): We also require that given a ciphertext c (with associated plaintext m) and any decryption shareμ i corresponding to c computed using dk i , no information is revealed about dk i . This is formalized by requiring that there exists a PPT algorithm SHE.ShareSim, which on input a set of decryption shares from the parties in set I with |I| ≤ t, can simulate the remaining (n − t) decryption shares {μ * j }, such that the simulated shares when combined with the shares of I, outputs m. Moreover, we want the statistical distance between the simulated and real shares to be at most 2 −sec .
Full details of the associated syntax, and the associated correctness and security definitions of our threshold L-level packed SHE scheme are given in Appendix A. In Appendix B we instantiate the abstract syntax with a threshold SHE scheme based on the BGV scheme [9] . We pause to note the difference between our underlying SHE scheme, which is just an SHE scheme which supports distributed decryption, and that of [1] which requires a special FHE scheme which is key homomorphic.
MPC from SHE -The Semi-honest Settings
In this section we present our generic MPC protocol for the computation of any arbitrary depth d circuit using an abstract threshold L-levelled SHE scheme. For the ease of exposition we first concentrate on the case of semi-honest security, and then we deal with active security in Section 5.
Without loss of generality we make the simplifying assumption that the function f to be computed takes a single input from each party and has a single output; specifically f : F n p → F p . The ideal functionality F f presented in Figure 1 computes such a given function f , represented by a well formed circuit C. -Upon receiving (sid, i, xi) from the party Pi for every i ∈ [1, . . . , n] where xi ∈ Fp, compute y = C(x1, . . . , xn), send (sid, y) to all the parties and the adversary S and halt. Here C denotes the (publicly known) well formed arithmetic circuit over Fp representing the function f . We will present a protocol to realize the ideal functionality F f in a hybrid model in which we are given access to an ideal functionality F SETUPGEN which implements a distributed key generation for the underlying SHE scheme. In particular the F SETUPGEN functionality presented in Figure 2 computes the public key, secret key, evaluation key and the keys for the distributed decryption of an L-levelled SHE scheme, distributes the public key and the evaluation key to all the parties and sends the ith key dk i (for the distributed decryption) to the party P i for each i ∈ [1, . . . , n]. In addition, the functionality also computes a random encryption c 1 with associated plaintext 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ M and sends it to all the parties. Looking ahead, c 1 will be required while proving the security of our MPC protocol. The ciphertext c 1 is at level one, as we only need it to pre-multiply the ciphertexts which are going to be decrypted via the distributed decryption protocol; thus the output of a multiplication by c 1 need only be at level zero. Looking ahead, this ensures that (with respect to our instantiation of SHE) the noise is kept to a minimum at this stage of the protocol.
Functionality F SETUPGEN FSETUPGEN interacts with the parties P1, . . . , Pn and the adversary S and is parameterized by an L-levelled SHE scheme -Upon receiving (sid, i) from the party Pi for every i ∈ [1, . . . , n], compute (pk, ek, sk, dk1, . . . , dkn) = SHE.KeyGen(1 κ , 1 sec , n, t) and (c1, 1) = SHE.LowerLevel ek ((SHE.Enc pk (1, r), 1) for 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ M and some randomness r. Finally send (sid, pk, ek, dki, (c1, 1)) to the party Pi for every i ∈ [1, . . . , n] and halt. Here we present our MPC protocol Π SH f in the F SETUPGEN -hybrid model. Let C be the (well formed) arithmetic circuit representing the function f and C aug be the associated augmented circuit (which includes the necessary Refresh gates). The protocol Π SH f (see Figure 3 ) runs in two phases: offline and online. The computation performed in the offline phase is completely independent of the circuit and (private) inputs of the parties and therefore can be carried out well ahead of the time (namely the online phase) when the function and inputs are known. If the parties have more than one input/output then one can apply packing/unpacking at the input/output stages of the protocol; we leave this minor modification to the reader.
In the offline phase, the parties interact with F SETUPGEN to obtain the public key, evaluation key and their respective keys for performing distributed decryption, corresponding to a threshold L-levelled SHE scheme.
aug denote an augmented circuit for a well formed circuit C over Fp representing f and let SHE be a threshold L-levelled SHE. Moreover, let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the set of n parties For the session ID sid the parties do the following:
Offline Computation: Every party Pi ∈ P does the following:
-Call FSETUPGEN with (sid, i) and receive (sid, pk, ek, dki, (c1, 1)).
, set the resultant ciphertext as the kth offline ciphertext cm k with the (unknown) associated plain-
Online Computation: Every party Pi ∈ P does the following:
-Input Stage: On having input xi ∈ Fp, compute (cx i , 1) = SHE.LowerLevel ek (SHE.Enc pk (χ(xi), ri), 1) with randomness ri and send (sid, i, (cx i , 1)) to each party. Receive (sid, j, (cx j , 1)) from each party Pj ∈ P. -Computation Stage: Associate the ciphertexts received in the previous stage with the corresponding input wires of C aug and then homomorphically evaluate the circuit C aug gate by gate as follows: • Addition Gate and Multiplication Gate: Given (c1, l1) and (c2, l2) associated with the input wires of the gate where l1, l2 ∈ [1, . . . , L], locally compute (c, l) = SHE.Add ek ((c1, l1), (c2, l2)) with l = min (l1, l2) for an addition gate and (c, l) = SHE.Mult ek ((c1, l1), (c2, l2)) with l = min (l1, l2) − 1 for a multiplication gate. Associate (c, l) with the output wire of the gate.
• Refresh Gate: For the kth refresh gate in the circuit, the kth offline ciphertext (cm k , L) is used. Let (c1, l1), . . . , (cN , lN ) be the ciphertexts associated with the input wires of the refresh gate where l1,
Locally compute the decryption shareμi = SHE.ShareDec dk i (cz+m, 0) and send (sid, i,μi) to every other party. On receiving (sid, j,μj) from every Pj ∈ P, compute the plaintext z + m k = SHE.ShareCombine((cz+m k , 0), {μj} j∈[1,...,n] ). * Re-encrypting: Locally re-encrypt z + m k by computing (ĉz+m k , L) = SHE.Enc pk (z + m k , r) using a publicly known (common) randomness r. 
to every other party. On receiving (sid, j, (cj, L)) from every Pj ∈ P, apply SHE.
• Output Decryption: Compute the decryption shareγi = SHE.ShareDec dk i (ĉ, 0) and send (sid, i,γi) to every party. On receiving (sid, j,γj) from every Pj ∈ P, compute y = SHE.ShareCombine((ĉ, 0), {γj} j∈[1,...,n] ), output y and halt, where y = χ −1 (y). Next each party sends encryptions of ζ random elements and then additively combines them to generate ζ ciphertexts at level L of truly random elements (unknown to the adversary). Here ζ is assumed to be large enough, so that for a typical circuit it is more than the number of refresh gates in the circuit, i.e. ζ > G R . Looking ahead, these random ciphertexts created in the offline phase are used in the online phase to evaluate refresh gates by (homomorphically) masking the messages associated with the input wires of a refresh gate. During the online phase, the parties encrypt their private inputs using the public key and distribute the corresponding ciphertexts to all other parties. These ciphertexts are transmitted at level one, thus consuming low bandwidth, and are then elevated to level L by the use of a following Refresh gate (which would have been inserted by the circuit augmentation process). Note that the inputs of the parties are in F p and so the parties first apply the mapping χ (embedding F p into the message space M of SHE) before encrypting their private inputs.
The input stage is followed by the homomorphic evaluation of C aug as follows: The addition and multiplication gates are evaluated locally using the addition and multiplication algorithm of the SHE. For each refresh gate, the parties execute the following protocol to enable a "multiparty bootstrapping" of the input ciphertexts: the parties pick one of the random ciphertext created in the offline phase (for each refresh gate a different ciphertext is used) and perform the following computation to refresh N ciphertexts with levels in the range [1, . . . , L] and obtain N fresh level L ciphertexts, with the associated messages unperturbed:
be the N ciphertexts with associated plaintexts χ(z 1 ), . . . , χ(z N ) with every z i ∈ F p , that need to be refreshed (i.e. they are the inputs of a refresh gate). -The N ciphertexts are then (locally) packed into a single ciphertext c, which is then homomorphically masked with a random ciphertext from the offline phase. -The resulting masked ciphertext is then publicly opened via distributed decryption, This allows for the creation of a fresh encryption of the opened value at level L. -The resulting fresh encryption is then homomorphically unmasked so that its associated plaintext is the same as original plaintext prior to the original masking. -This fresh (unmasked) ciphertext is then unpacked to obtain N fresh ciphertexts, having the same associated plaintexts as the original N ciphertexts c i but at level L.
By packing the ciphertexts together we only need to invoke distributed decryption once, instead of N times. This leads to a more communication efficient online phase, since the distributed decryption is the only operation that demands communication. Without affecting the correctness of the above technique, but to ensure security, we add an additional step while doing the masking: the parties homomorphically pre-multiply the ciphertext c with c 1 before masking. Recall that c 1 is an encryption of 1 ∈ M generated by F SETUPGEN and so by doing the above operation, the plaintext associated with c remains the same. During the simulation in the security proof, this step allows the simulator to set the decrypted value to the random mask (irrespective of the circuit inputs), by playing the role of F SETUPGEN and replacing c 1 with c 0 , a random encryption of 0 = (0, . . . , 0). Furthermore, this step explains the reason why we made provision for an extra multiplication during circuit augmentation by insisting that the refresh gates take inputs with labels in
; the details are available in the simulation proof of security of our MPC protocol. Finally, the function output y is obtained by another distributed decryption of the output ciphertext. However, this step is also not secure unless the ciphertext is randomized again by pre-multiplication by c 1 and adding n encryptions of 0 where each party contributes one encryption. In the simulation, the simulator gives encryption of χ(y) on behalf of one honest party and replaces c 1 by c 0 , letting the output ciphertext correspond to the actual output y, even though the circuit is evaluated with zero as the inputs of the honest parties during the simulation (the simulator will not know the real inputs of the honest parties and thus will simulate them with zero). A similar idea was also used in [17] ; details can be found in the security proof.
Intuitively, privacy follows because at any stage of the computation, the keys of the honest parties for the distributed decryption are not revealed and so the adversary will not be able to decrypt any intermediate ciphertext. Correctness follows from the properties of the SHE and the fact that the level of each ciphertext in the protocol remains in the range [1, . . . , L], thanks to the refresh gates. So even though the circuit C may have any arbitrary depth d > L, we can homomorphically evaluate C using an L-levelled SHE. Figure 1 ) be the ideal functionality computing f and let SHE be a threshold L-levelled SHE scheme. Then the protocol Π SH f UC-secure realizes F f against a static, semihonest adversary A, corrupting upto t < n parties in the F SETUPGEN -hybrid Model.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix E.
MPC from SHE -The Active Setting
The functionalities from Section 4 are in the passive corruption model. In the presence of an active adversary, the functionalities will be modified as follows: the respective functionality considers the input received from the majority of the parties and performs the task it is supposed to do on those inputs. For example, in the case of F f , the functionality considers for the computation those x i s, corresponding to the P i s from which the functionality has received the message (sid, i, x i ); on the behalf of the remaining P i s, the functionality substitutes 0 as the default input for the computation. Similarly for F SETUPGEN , the functionality performs its task if it receives the message (sid, i) from the majority of the parties. These are the standard notions of defining ideal functionalities for various corruption scenarios and we refer [30] for the complete formal details; we will not present separately the ideal functionality F f and F SETUPGEN for the malicious setting.
A closer look at Π SH f shows that we can "compile" it into an actively secure MPC protocol tolerating t active corruptions if we ensure that every corrupted party "proves" in a zero knowledge (ZK) fashion that it constructed the following correctly: (1) The ciphertexts in the offline phase; (2) The ciphertexts during the input stage and (3) The randomizing ciphertexts during the output stage.
Apart from the above three requirements, we would also require a "robust" SHE.ShareCombine which works correctly even if up to t input decryption shares are incorrect. In Appendix F we show that for our specific SHE scheme, the SHE.ShareCombine algorithm (based on the standard error-correction) is indeed robust, provided t < n/3. For the case of t < n/2 we show (in Appendix F) that by including additional steps and incorporating additional zero-knowledge proofs (namely proof of correct decryption), one can also obtain a robust output. Interestingly the MPC protocol requires the transmission of at most O(n 3 ) such additional zero-knowledge proofs; i.e. the communication needed to obtain robustness is independent of the circuit being computed. We stress that t < n/2 is the optimal resilience for computationally secure MPC against active corruptions (with fairness) [31] . In this paper, to keep the protocol presentation and its proof simple, we assume a robust SHE.ShareCombine (i.e. for the case of t < n/3), which applies error correction for the correct decryption.
Before presenting the actively secure MPC protocol, we present in Figure 4 an ideal ZK functionality F R ZK , parametrized with an NP-relation R, which will be used in our protocol. We next apply this functionality to the following relations to obtain the functionalities F Renc ZK and F Rzeroenc ZK .
we require this relation to hold for the offline stage ciphertexts (where l = L) and for the input stage ciphertexts (where l = 1).
we require this relation to hold for the randomizing ciphertexts during the output stage.
We are now ready to present the protocol Π )-hybrid model and assuming a robust SHE.ShareCombine based on error-correction (i.e. for the case t < n/3).
ZK interacts with a prover Pi ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn} and the set of n verifiers P = {P1, . . . , Pn} and the adversary S.
-Upon receiving (sid, i, (x, w)) from the prover Pi ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn}, the functionality sends (sid, i, x) to all the verifiers in P and S if R(x, w) is true. Else it sends (sid, i, ⊥) and halts. Let C be the well formed arithmetic circuit over Fp representing the function f , let C aug denote an augmented circuit associated with C, and let SHE be a threshold L-levelled SHE scheme. For session ID sid the parties in P = {P1, . . . , Pn} do the following:
-Same as in the offline phase of Π SH f , except that for every message m ik for k ∈ [1, . . . , ζ] and the corresponding ciphertext
with randomness ri and call F Renc ZK with the message (sid, i,
for some Pj ∈ P, then consider a publicly known level 1 encryption of χ(0) as (cx j , 1) for such a Pj. 
for some Pj ∈ P, then consider a publicly known level L encryption of 0 as (cj, L) for such a Pj.
• The rest of the steps are same as in Π SH f , except that now the robust SHE.ShareCombine is used. Figure 1 ) be the ideal functionality computing f and let SHE be a threshold L-levelled SHE scheme such that SHE.ShareCombine is robust. Then the protocol Π
)-hybrid Model against a static, active adversary A corrupting t parties.
See appendix F for the proof of the theorem. In the same appendix, we further present a more efficient offline phase attaining a linear communication overhead (asymptotically) in the number of preprocessed ciphertexts. We note that UC-secure realizations of F Renc ZK and F Rzeroenc ZK can be obtained in the CRS model using similar techniques as used in [2] . Finally we do not worry about the instantiation of F SETUPGEN as we consider it a one time set-up, which can be done via standard techniques (such as running an MPC protocol).
Estimating the Consumed Bandwidth
In Appendix C we determine the parameters for the instantiation of our SHE scheme using BGV by adapting the analysis from [27] and [16] . In this section we use this parameter estimation to show that our MPC protocol can infact give improved communication complexity compared to the standard MPC protocols, for relatively small values of the parameter L. We are interested in the communication cost of our online stage computation. To ease our exposition we will focus on the passively secure case from section 4; the analysis for the active security case with t < n/3 is exactly the same (bar the additional cost of the exchange of zero-knowledge proofs for the input stage and the output stage). For the case of active security with t < n/2 we also need to add in the communication related to the dispute control strategy outlined in Appendix F for attaining robust SHE.ShareCombine with t < n/2; but this is a cost which is proportional to O(n 3 ).
To get a feel for the parameters from Appendix C, we now specialise to the case of finite fields of size p ≈ 2 64 , statistical security parameter sec of 40, and for various values of the computational security level κ. Resolving the various inequalities (from Appendix C), we then estimate in Table 1 the value of N , assuming a small value for n (we need to restrict to small n to ensure a large enough range in the PRF needed in the distributed decryption protocol; see Appendix B.4). Since a Refresh gate requires the transmission of n − 1 elements (namely the decryption shares) in the ring R q 0 from party P i to the other parties, the total communication in our protocol (in bits) is
where |R q 0 | is the number of bits needed to transmit an element in R q 0 , i.e. N · log 2 p 0 . Assuming the circuit meets our requirement of being well formed, this implies that total communication cost for our protocol is
Using the batch distributed technique (of efficiently and parallely evaluating t + 1 independent Refresh gates simultaneously) from Appendix B.6 this can be reduced to
We are interested in the overhead per multiplication gate, in terms of equivalent numbers of finite field elements in F p , which is given by Cost/(|G M | · log 2 p), and the cost per party is Cost/(|G M | · n · log 2 p). At the 128 bit security level, with p ≈ 2 64 , and sec = 40 (along with the above estimated values of N ), this means for n = 3 parties, and at most t = 1 corruption, we obtain the following cost estimates: Note for L = 2 our protocol becomes the one which requires interaction after every multiplication, for L = 3 we require interaction only after every two multiplications and so on. Note that most practical MPC protocols in the preprocessing model have a per gate per party communication cost of at least 2 finite field elements, e.g. [23] . Thus, even when L = 5, we obtain better communication efficiency in the online phase than traditional practical protocols in the preprocessing model with these parameters.
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A Threshold L-Levelled Packed Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
In this Appendix we present a detailed explanation of the syntax and requirements for our Threshold LLevelled Packed Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme. Let C(L) denote the family of circuits consisting of addition and multiplication gates whose labels follow the conventions in Section 2; except that input wires have label L and whose minimum wire label is zero. Thus C(L) is the family of standard arithmetic circuits of multiplicative depth at most L which consist of 2-input addition and multiplication gates over F p , whose wire labels lie in the range [0, . . . , L]. Informally, an L-levelled SHE scheme supports homomorphic evaluation of any circuit in the family C(L) where the input wire values v i are mapped to ciphertexts (at level L) by encrypting χ(v i ).
As remarked in the introduction we could also, as in [26] , extend the circuit family C(L) to include gates which process N input values at once as
But such an optimization of the underlying circuit is orthogonal to our consideration. However, the underlying L-levelled packed SHE scheme supports such operations on its underlying plaintext (we will just not consider these operations in our circuits being evaluated).
We can evaluate however subcircuits in C(L); and this is how we will describe the homomorphic evaluation below (this will later help us to argue the correctness property of our general MPC protocol). In particular if C ∈ C(L), we can deal with sub-circuits C sub of C whose input wires have labels l in 1 , . . . , l in Definition 2 (Threshold L-levelled Packed SHE). An L-levelled public key packed somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme with the underlying message space M = F N p , public key space PK, secret key space SK, evaluation key space EK, ciphertext space CT and distributed decryption key space DK i for i ∈ [1, . . . , n] is a collection of the following PPT algorithms, parametrized by a computational security parameter κ and a statistical security parameter sec:
1. SHE.KeyGen(1 κ , 1 sec , n, t) → (pk, ek, sk, dk 1 , . . . , dk n ): The key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk ∈ PK, a public evaluation key ek ∈ EK, a secret key sk ∈ SK and n keys (dk 1 , . . . , dk n ) for the distributed decryption, with dk i ∈ DK i .
SHE.Enc
The encryption algorithm computes a ciphertext c ∈ CT , which encrypts a plaintext vector m ∈ M under the public key pk using the randomness 1 r and outputs (c, L) to indicate that the associated level of the ciphertext is L. 
The homomorphic evaluation algorithm is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm (polynomial in L, in , out and κ) that takes as input the evaluation key ek, a sub-circuit C sub of a circuit C ∈ C(L) with in input gates and out output gates as well as a set of in ciphertexts c 1 , . 
is the label associated to the given input/output wire in C sub . Algorithm SHE.Eval associates the input ciphertexts with the input gates of C sub and homomorphically evaluates C sub gate by gate in an SIMD manner on the components of the input messages. For this, SHE.Eval consists of separate algorithms SHE.Add and SHE.Mult for homomorphically evaluating addition and multiplication gates respectively. More specifically, given two ciphertexts (c 1 , l 1 ) and (c 2 , l 2 ) with associated levels l 1 and l 2 respectively where 
. Then the following holds with probability one for each i ∈ [1, . . . , out ]:
We also require the following security properties:
-Key Generation Security: Let S and D i be the random variables which denote the probability distribution with which the secret key sk and the ith key dk i for the distributed decryption is selected from SK and DK i by SHE.KeyGen for i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, for a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let D I denote the random variable which denote the probability distribution with which the set of keys for the distributed decryption, belonging to the indices in I, are selected from the corresponding DK i s by SHE.KeyGen. Then the following two properties hold:
• Correctness: For any set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≥ t + 1, H(S|D I ) = 0. Here H(X|Y ) denotes the conditional entropy of a random variable X with respect to a random variable Y [14] .
• Privacy: For any set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t, H(S|D I ) = H(S).
-Semantic Security: For every set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t and all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following game is negligible in κ:
• Key Generation: The challenger runs SHE.KeyGen(1 κ , 1 sec , n, t) to obtain (pk, ek, sk, dk 1 , . . . , dk n ) and sends pk, ek and {dk i } i∈I to A. 
-Share Simulation Indistinguishability: There exists a PPT simulator SHE.ShareSim, which on input a subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size at most t, a ciphertext (c, l) of level l ∈ [0, . . . , L], a plaintext m and |I| decryption shares {μ i } i∈I outputs n − |I| simulated decryption shares {μ * j } j∈I with the following property: For any (pk, ek, sk, dk 1 , . . . , dk n ) obtained as the output of SHE.KeyGen, any subsets I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size at most t, any m ∈ M and any (c, l) where m = SHE.Dec sk (c, l), the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable:
where for all i ∈ [1, . . . , n],μ i = SHE.ShareDec dk i (c, l). We require in particular that the statistical distance between the two distributions is bounded by 2 −sec . Moreover SHE.ShareCombine((c, l), {μ i } i∈I ∪ SHE.ShareSim((c, l), m, {μ i } i∈I )) outputs the result m. Here I denotes the complement of the set I; i.e. I = {1, . . . , n} \ I.
B Instantiating our FHE using BGV
In this section we show an instantiation of SHE based on the scheme of Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan (BGV) ( [9] ). As in [5] we make use of Shamir secret sharing to share the secret key among the parties and pseudorandom secret sharing (PRSS) [15] to non-interactively share a pseudorandom value from a chosen interval. We describe a variant of the BGV-type cryptosystems based on the ring learning with error (RLWE) assumption ( [34] ), naturally supporting the packing operations described in Appendix A.
B.1 Preliminaries
Plaintext Space: We define the polynomial ring R := Z[x]/(f (x)), where f (x) is a monic irreducible polynomial. For our purposes it will suffice to fix f (x) as the cyclotomic polynomial Φ m (x) = x m/2 + 1 with m a power of two. We set N = φ(m) = m/2, where φ is the Euler totient function. The ring R is the ring of integers of the mth cyclotomic number field Q(ζ m ), with ζ m an mth root of unity. Denote by R q := R/qR, for an integer q the reduction of R modulo q, i.e. the set of all integer polynomials of degree at most N − 1 with coefficients in (−q/2, q/2].
Looking ahead the plaintext space of the scheme will be defined to be R p := R/pR for some prime p such that p ≡ 1 mod m. Since p ≡ 1 (mod m), the polynomial Φ m (x) splits into distinct linear factors
, where each factor corresponds to an independent "plaintext slot", holding an element of the finite field F p . Thus each message m ∈ M actually corresponds to N messages in F p and can be represented as an N -vector (m mod F i ) i=1,...,N . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem addition and multiplication in R p correspond to SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) operations on the slots and this allows to process N input values at once as described in Appendix Section A.
If we consider the Galois group Gal of Q(ζ m ), then Gal = Gal(Q(ζ m )/Q) ∼ = Z * m and it is formed by the mappings σ i : a(x) → a(x i ) mod Φ m (x) for all i ∈ Z * m . It is well known ( [26] ) that Gal transitively acts on plaintext slots, i.e. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N } there exists an element σ i→j ∈ Gal which sends an element in slot i to an element in slot j.
Random Values: During our construction we will need to sample elements from different distributions over R q . We will use the following distributions over R, and then map to R q as appropriate. Pseudorandom Secret Sharing Over Polynomial Rings: Pseudorandom secret sharing was first introduced in [15] . Given a setup, a PRSS scheme allows parties to generate almost unlimited number of Shamir sharings of pseudorandom values at the cost of no communication. Furthermore, the setup is generated once and for all and therefore can be reused many times. While known PRSS works over fields or rings [15, 5] , for our purposes we will require a PRSS defined over the polynomial rings R q l .
In [15] the construction of a PRSS was presented. This was used in [5] to construct a PRSS over Z q , where q = p i for n parties, such that each p i is prime with p i > n. This construction immediately extends to R q by computing the underlying PRF N times. For completeness we overview the construction here: Given an element s ∈ R q , we use [s] for the Shamir's sharing of s, [s] i = s i for the ith component of the sharing of s, i = 1, . . . , n. We assume a prior one-time setup which distributes a vector of shared keys k A = (k 0,A , . . . , k N −1,A ) to each party in A for every subset A of size n − t. These keys will be used as the keys of a keyed pseudorandom function PRF family, {ψ k (·)} k∈K . The pseudorandomness of the output of the following algorithm can be reduced to the PRF security of the underlying PRF at the cost of security loss by a factor of 1/N .
1. The parties in P agree on N elements t j ∈ Z q for j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. 2. For j = 0, . . . , N − 1, every party
Where f A (X) denotes the polynomial of degree at most t, such that f A (0) = 1 and f A (l) = 0 for every P l ∈ A. 3. For j = 0, . . . , N − 1, the value s j = A⊂P:|A|=n−t,P i ∈A ψ k j,A (t j ) denotes the jth pseudorandom shared value from Z q . Define the associated element in R q by the polynomial s j X j .
If the underlying PRF family has range [−T, . . . , T ] over Z q then the output of the above PRSS is an element in R q whose coefficients lie in the range [− n t T, n t T ]. To ease notation we write s = A⊂P:|A|=n−t,P i ∈A ψ k A (t) for the shared value in R q , and [s] i = A⊂P:|A|=n−t,P i ∈A ψ k A (t) · f A (i) for the shares themselves. We note that in general n t becomes exponentially large, specially if t is a constant fraction of n; however in most practical applications of threshold cryptography, the number of parties n is indeed expected to be small. Canonical Embedding Norm: Here we recall some results on cyclotomic fields that we need to estimate the parameters of our protocol instantiations. For details regarding properties of canonical norms we refer to [27, 26, 23] . Given a polynomial a ∈ R we denote by a ∞ = max 0≤i≤N −1 |a i | the standard l ∞ -norm. All estimates of noise are taken with respect to the canonical embedding norm a can ∞ = σ(a) ∞ , where σ is the canonical embedding R → C φ(m) defined by σ : a → a(ζ k m ), k ∈ Z * m and ζ m a fixed primitive mth root of unity. When a ∈ R q , for some modulus q, we need the canonical embedding norm reduced modulo q:
To map from norms in the canonical embedding to norms on the coefficients of the polynomials defining the elements in R we note that we have a ∞ ≤ c m · a can ∞ , where c m is the ring constant. Since we fix the choice of our base field polynomial as a 2 k th cyclotomic polynomial, we have c m = 1.
B.2 The Basic L-levelled Packed BGV-type Cryptosystem
We review the BGV L-levelled Packed SHE scheme. The scheme is parametrized by a security parameter κ, for a fixed number of levels L + 1. Note, we use L + 1 levels in our scheme description to make the presentation consistent with the abstract scheme from Appendix A. For l = 0, . . . , L, fix a chain of moduli q l = l i=0 p i , with p i a prime number. Encryption generates level L ciphertexts with respect to the largest modulus q L . In the lth level of the scheme ciphertexts consist of two elements in R q l , l = 0, . . . , L. Throughout homomorphic evaluation we will force a universal bound B on the noise contained in ciphertexts (when measured in the canonical embedding norm reduced modulo q) after a SHE.LowerLevel execution. Since a ∞ ≤ a can ∞ ≤ B this provides an upper bound also on the coefficients used in the underlying decryption algorithm, for such outputs of SHE.LowerLevel. For a description of the algorithm SHE.LowerLevel see [27] ; where it is called modulus switching.
However, when applying decryption, or distributed decryption, we will apply the procedure to a ciphertext which is not the direct output of a SHE.LowerLevel operation. In particular we assume that the canonical norm of the noise of an element passed to the decryption procedure will be bounded by B dec . The decryption procedures will then return the correct output if we have B dec ≤ q 0 /2. For distributed decryption we will need to "boost" this bound to 2 exp · B dec , where exp is a "closeness parameter" relating to the statistical security parameter sec. Thus distributed decryption will be work if and only if 2 exp · B dec < q 0 /2. Below we specify the basic algorithms for the BGV scheme; we will then discuss the extensions to cope with the full syntax of our scheme in Definition 2.
Before presenting the methods we need to pause briefly to remind the reader about modulus switching: A ciphertext at level l is given by a pair c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ R 2 q l and the decryption procedure computes, for the global secret key sk ∈ R,
where we take the symmetric modular operation in the range [−q l /2, . . . 1. SHE.KeyGen(1 κ ) → (pk, ek, sk): Outputs a secret key sk ← HWT (h, N ), a common public key pk = (a, b) such that a ← U s (q L , N ) and b = a · sk + p · e, with e ← DG(σ 2 , N ). This algorithm also outputs the evaluation key ek which consists of N + 1 public "key-switching matrices" W sk 2 →sk and W σ i (sk)→sk and σ i ∈ Gal for i = 1, . . . , N . See [27] for how these are defined. 2. SHE.Enc pk (m) → (c, L): Given a plaintext m ∈ R p , the encryption algorithm samples (v, e 0 , e 1 ) ← RC s (0.5, σ 2 , N ) and then computes in R q L ,
3. SHE.Dec sk (c, l) → m : Note, this algorithm is never called in our scheme, we just present it here so as to define correctness and to define what we mean by a message associated to a ciphertext. The algorithm takes as input a ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ R 2 q l and outputs a plaintext m ∈ R p . This algorithm uses the secret key sk to compute µ = c 0 − sk · c 1 = m + p · (e · v + e 0 − s · e 1 ) = m + p · u in R q l and then obtains m = (µ mod p). We denote by ν the estimated noise magnitude obtained by using the canonical embedding norm and we require that ν < B dec . This decryption procedure will correctly work if B dec < q l /2.
SHE.Eval
This consists of three separate algorithm SHE.Add, SHE.Mult and SHE.ScalarMult for homomorphically evaluating addition and multiplication gates.
-SHE.Add ek ((c 1 , l 1 ), (c 2 , l 2 )): It produces a ciphertext c Add in R 2 q l , with l = min{l 1 , l 2 }. This is performed by first applying c i = SHE.LowerLevel ek ((c i , l i ), l) and then taking the coordinate-wise addition of c 1 and c 2 . The noise magnitude of the resulting ciphertext is at most the sum of the noise in c 1 and c 2 .
-SHE.Mult ek ((c 1 , l 1 ), (c 2 , l 2 ) ): This produces a ciphertext c Mult in R 2 q l , with l = min{l 1 , l 2 } − 1. This is done in one of two ways (so as to minimize the overall parameter sizes in our scheme).
• If l = 1 then one first applies c i = SHE.LowerLevel ek ((c i , l i ), l), then the resulting ciphertexts are tensored. This results in a ciphertextc is a vector of higher dimension ( [11] ) and corresponding to a valid ciphertext of the SIMD-product of the associated plaintexts m 1 · m 2 with respect to a secret key sk that is the tensor product of the secret key sk with itself. The Key Switching procedure ( [27] ) is then applied, using the matrix W sk 2 →sk , to obtain a valid ciphertext c Mult ∈ R 2 q l with respect to the original secret key sk. The noise magnitude in c Mult is at approximately product of norms of the noise in c 1 and c 2 .
• If l = 1 then one applies the tensor operation to c 1 and c 2 directly, then the key switching is performed and only then is a SHE.LowerLevel operation performed. This results in us needing a larger prime p 1 than one would otherwise need, but more importantly a smaller p 0 . -SHE.ScalarMult ek ((c, l), a): If c = (c 0 , c 1 ) then one can obtain a homomorphic scalar multiplication by evaluating c = (a · c 0 , a · c 1 ). This procedure increases the noise, but not by as much as a normal multiplication. Therefore we shall ignore the noise increase produced by scalar multiplication in our analysis.
Using the evaluation key we can also define an addition homomorphic operation as in [26, 27] ,
, corresponding to a plaintext m ∈ R p , this generates a ciphertextĉ Permute = (ĉ 0 ,ĉ 1 ) ∈ R 2 q l corresponding to σ(m), with respect to the secret key σ(sk). Key switching is then applied, using the keyswitching matrix W σ(sk)→sk to produce a ciphertext,ĉ Permute decryptable under sk.
B.3 Defining SHE.Pack and SHE.Unpack for BGV
Despite our scheme being a packed SHE scheme it can still evaluate unpacked ciphertexts; indeed many of the instances of packed SHE schemes were originally conceived in the unpacked case by taking the map χ to be χ(m) = (m, m, . . . , m), i.e. the diagonal embedding. For example this is the case with the schemes in [37, 11, 10, 8] etc all of which have packed counterparts. However, such a choice of χ is not efficient if one is interested in packing and unpacking encryptions of elements in F p . We wish to define two functions SHE.Pack and SHE.Unpack; the first of which takes N ciphertexts c i at level l i with the associated plaintext vector χ(m i ) for m i ∈ F p , and produces a single ciphertext c at level min(l i ) with the associated plaintext vector m = (m 1 , . . . , m N ) ∈ M. The second function performs the reverse operation.
In what follows we let e i denote the i-th unit vector in M, i.e. the element which is zero except for a one in the i-th position. To ease notation we let ⊕ and ⊗ denote the operations of applying the SHE.Add and SHE.Mult/SHE.ScalarMult operations respectively, we also let σ(c) denote applying the SHE.Permute operation to a ciphertext c and map σ ∈ Gal. 
Thus we will utilize the mapping χ(m) = (m, 0, . . . , 0) in our proposal.
B.4 Distributed Decryption Protocol
All that remains to define our Threshold L-levelled Packed SHE system based on BGV is to present the distributed decryption protocol. Note that we do not use the key-homomorphic properties of RLWE schemes as previously used in [1, 33, 2] . Instead, we follow the approach of [5] , where the authors construct a threshold variant of Regev's cryptosystem ([36]); we adapt this method to our situation.
At a high level the method works as follows: we modify the SHE.KeyGen algorithm so that it also outputs for each party P i a key dk i for performing distributed decryption. The key dk i consists of two components; i.e. dk i = (sk i , k i ). The values sk i form a Shamir sharing over the ring R q 0 of the secret key sk, with threshold t. The value k i are the associated keys for the PRSS described above. Given a common ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ R q l as input (for decryption), the parties first apply SHE.LowerLevel to reduce the ciphertext to level zero. Then each party P i computes a decryption shareμ i using his private sk i and a PRSS over R q 0 as described earlier. The underlying PRF we assume produces values in the range
where B dec is the bound on the canonical norm of an element being decrypted mentioned earlier, and hence an upper bound on the size of the coefficients of the noise polynomial reconstructed during the standard decryption procedure. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of B dec . The choice of this range of the underlying PRF family means that the values output by the PRSS will be shares of elements in R q l whose coefficients lie in the range [−(
Note, that n t for t ≈ n/2 grows very fast, and so the for the above range of the PRF to be suitably large we require that n is small. In our discussion we implicitly assume n to be small, say n < 10.
Recall distributed decryption is defined by two algorithms SHE.ShareDec and SHE.ShareCombine. These are defined by the following procedures:
1. Apply SHE.LowerLevel ek ((c, l), 0) to obtain the ciphertext (c 0 , c 1 ) at level zero (unless c is already at level zero).
Compute
where the computation is in R q 0 . 3. Execute the PRSS, using the PRF keys k i , to obtain a Shamir's share r i of a "random" value r ∈ R q 0 such that r = k A ψ k A (t) and r ∞ < ((2 exp − 1) · B dec )/p, for some agreed vector of values t which are a function of the input ciphertext c.
and outputμ i as the decryption share.
-SHE. ShareCombine((c, l) , {μ i } i∈[1,...,n] ) → m : given a set n of decryption sharesμ i and (in the malicious setting) an error correction procedure, reconstructμ = µ + p · r by applying the error correction procedure to {μ i } i∈[1...,n] and output m = (μ mod p).
Note decryption will work as long as the reconstructed valueμ is less than q 0 /2, i.e. we require 2 exp · B dec < q 0 /2 (see the next section for details). We pause to note the different situations where one obtains correct message recovery from the algorithm SHE.ShareCombine. In the case of passive adversaries we will show (in the next section) that the above distributed decryption procedure is secure as long as t < n. Since we are using Shamir sharing, in the presence of t < n/3 active corruptions, using the natural error correction properties (namely Reed-Solomon (RS) error correction), we can correctly recover the message at the end of SHE.ShareCombine.
When t < n/2 a little more work is involved; if an adversary sends an incorrect share then this can be detected, again because we are using Shamir as the underlying secret sharing scheme. At this point the parties execute a party elimination strategy in which they require each other to prove in zero-knowledge that the provided share is correct. Once the cheater party(s) have been determined they are eliminated from the protocol and the protocol resumes. Thus for active adversaries and t < n/2 we may require a grand total of an extra n 2 · t zero-knowledge proofs to be constructed, irrespective of the size of the circuit in our main protocol; see Appendix F for more details.
B.5 Security of Our Threshold BGV Instantiation
Recall from earlier we require four security properties:
-Key Generation Security.
-Semantic Security.
-Correct Share Decryption.
-Share Simulation Indistinguishability.
We now discuss each of these in turn.
Key Generation Security: The required properties of the keys produced by the key generation algorithm follow from the security properties of the Shamir secret sharing scheme used to share sk. We note in our main protocol we assume an ideal functionality to distribute such keys, and so there is no "Key Generation" protocol to analyse.
Semantic Security: The follows from the standard semantic security of the BGV scheme. However, we need to deal with the fact that the adversary has access to shares of the underlying secret key and the keys to the PRSS. A standard simulation shows that security in our setting reduces to that in the standard setting.
Correct Share Decryption: The infinity norm of the elementμ = µ + p · r produced by the algorithm SHE.ShareCombine is bounded by
Share Simulation Indistinguishability: We need to present a PPT algorithm (simulator) SHE.ShareSim which when given a ciphertext c ∈ R 2 q l with associated plaintext m ∈ R p , a subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that |I| = t, and a set of t decryption shares {μ i } i∈I , whereμ i = SHE.ShareDec dk i ((c, l) ), can simulate the remaining (n − t) decryption shares {μ * j } in such a way that the following two following distributions are statistically indistinguishable:
whereĪ = {1, . . . , n} \ I. i.e. one cannot distinguish the real shares for the setĪ (as computed by SHE.ShareDec algorithm) with ones produced by the simulator. Moreover, we require the statistical distance between the two distributions to be bounded by 2 −sec . The simulator is constructed as follows:
Let k (I)
A denote the set of keys for the PRSS that have been given to parties P i where i ∈ I, and let k (Ī) A denote the set of keys for the PRSS held by P j , for j ∈Ī.
The simulator first computes
where each r k ∈ R q l is chosen such that
In this way r ∞ <
3. Letμ * = m + p · r . For each j ∈Ī, the simulator outputsμ * j such that {μ * j } j∈Ī , {μ i } i∈I is a consistent vector of shares ofμ * ; i.e. the simulator deterministically computes consistent shares for the honest parties via Lagrange interpolation of the t + 1 values,μ * and {μ i } i∈I .
Before proving the properties of the simulation, we recall the following lemma from [2] :
Lemma 1 (Smudging Lemma [2] ). Let B 1 and B 2 be positive integers and let e 1 ∈ [−B 1 , B 1 ] be a fixed integer and let e 2 ∈ [−B 2 , B 2 ] be chosen uniformly and randomly. Then the statistical distance between the distribution of e 2 and e 2 + e 1 is B 1 /B 2 .
To prove the properties of the simulation, we first note that similar to the last stage of the simulation above, the real shares for the honest parties can be constructed (deterministically) fromμ and the shares held by the t dishonest parties. Thus, to prove indistinguishability of the real and simulated shares, it suffices to prove thatμ * = m + p · r andμ = µ + p · r are statistically close 3 . To see this is indeed the case, we first note that µ + p · r and µ + p · r are indistinguishable (by construction) and that r is uniform in an exponentially larger range than µ (recall that µ ∞ < B dec and r ∞ <
). By application of the Smudging lemma, the statistical distance between the distribution of µ+p·r and the uniform distribution of polynomials with coefficients in [−(
To conclude the proof, we next claim that the distribution of m + p · r is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution of polynomials with coefficients [−(2 exp − 1) · B dec , (2 exp − 1) · B dec ]. This follows from the fact that the statistical distance between the two distributions is N ·p B dec ·(2 exp −1) (which itself 3 For statistically close distributions X s ≈ Y and any deterministic procedure A applied to those distributions it is the case that
follows from the Smudging Lemma and the fact that m ∈ R p ). It follows from the triangle inequality that the overall statistical distance between the distribution ofμ * = m + p · r andμ = µ + p · r is upper bounded by
Since p < B dec this simplifies to exp = sec + log 2 (N ) + 1, and we can therefore ensure the statistical distance is bounded by 2 −sec which can be made arbitrarily small by our choice of exp.
B.6 Batch Distributed Decryption
Using a well known technique presented in [3, 18] , we can perform a batch of t + 1 = Θ(n) distributed decryption, and hence evaluate a batch of t + 1 Refresh gates at the communication cost of performing two distributed decryptions. The following technique applies to our main MPC protocol if the batch of refresh gates are independent, meaning the output wire of one does not lead to the input of the other.
Given a value shared among the parties, its public reconstruction requires each party to send the share (of the value) it holds to every other party. This requires n · (n − 1) pair-wise communication of shares. So for t + 1 shared values, the public reconstruction will require O(n 3 ) pair-wise communication of shares. In what follows, it is shown how the above can be achieved with the same cost of public reconstruction of a single value, namely with a communication of 2 · n · (n − 1) = O(n 2 ) shares. The idea was used in the information theoretically secure MPC protocols of [3, 18] .
Let u (1) , . . . , u (t+1) be t + 1 shared values. First the t + 1 shared values are "expanded" to n shared values, say v (1) , . . . , v (n) by applying a linear function locally. Specifically, if the underlying LSS is Shamir, then we can interpret u (1) , . . . , u (t+1) as the coefficients of a polynomial of degree at most t, say u(·) and let v (1) , . . . , v (n) be the n distinct points on this polynomial. Now notice that obtaining v (1) , . . . , v (n) from u (1) , . . . , u (t+1) is a linear function and by (locally) applying the same linear function on the sharings of u (1) , . . . , u (t+1) , the parties can obtain sharings of v (1) , . . . , v (n) . Now each v (i) is reconstructed only to P i and this costs O(n 2 ) communication of shares. Finally every P i sends v (i) to every other party (which costs another O(n 2 ) communication) and then every party can reconstruct u(·) and hence u (1) , . . . , u (t+1) .
In our setting all of the above sharing is done using Shamir over the ring R q 0 . It is easy to see that the above can be carried out with no change to the underlying SHE scheme. Thus assuming our initial circuit is large enough, i.e. there are enough independent Refresh gates at each level, we can obtain a performance improvement of (t + 1)/2.
C Parameter Calculation
In [27] a concrete set of parameters for the BGV SHE scheme was given for the case of binary message spaces, and arbitrary L. In [16] this was adapted to the case of message space R p for 2-power cyclotomic rings, but only for the schemes which could support one level of multiplication gates (i.e. for L = 1). In this section we combine these analyses to produce parameter estimations for the case we require of arbitrary L and messages defined by a "large prime", e.g. p ≈ 2 32 , 2 64 or 2 128 . We assume in this section that the reader is familiar with the analysis and algorithms from [27] ; we mainly point out the differences in estimates for our case.
Our analysis will make extensive use of the following fact: If a ∈ R be chosen from a distribution such that the coefficients are distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ, then if ζ m is a primitive mth root of unity, we can use 6 · σ to bound a(ζ m ) and hence the canonical embedding norm of a. If we have two elements with variances σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 , then we can bound the canonical norm of their product with 16 · σ 1 · σ 2 . Recall from Appendix B that we require a chain of moduli q 0 < q 1 . . . < q L corresponding to each level of the scheme, where q L = q 0 · i=L i=1 p i . Note that we evaluate a depth L circuit from a chain of L + 1 moduli. Also note, that we apply a SHE.LowerLevel (a.k.a. modulus switch) algorithm before a multiplication operation, except when multiplying at level one. This often leads to lower noise values in practice (which a practical instantiation can make use of). In addition it eliminates the need to perform a modulus switch after encryption.
We utilize the following constants described in [16] , which are worked out for the case of message space defined modulo p (the constants in [16] make use of an additional parameter n, arising from the key generation procedure. In our case we can take this constant equal to one).
The constants are used in the following manner: A freshly encrypted ciphertext at level L has noise bounded by B Clean . In the worst case, when applying SHE.LowerLevel to a ciphertext at level l with noise bounded by B one obtains a new ciphertext at level l − 1 with noise bounded by
When applying the tensor product multiplication operation to ciphertexts of a given level l of noise B 1 and B 2 one obtains a new ciphertext with noise given by
where P is a value to be determined later. As in [27] we define a small "wiggle room" ξ which we set to be equal to eight; this is set to enable a number of additions to be performed without needing to individually account for them in our analysis.
A general evaluation procedure begins with a freshly encrypted ciphertext at level L with noise B Clean . When entering the first multiplication operation we first apply a SHE.LowerLevel operation to reduce the noise to our universal bound B. We therefore require
We now turn to dealing with the SHE.LowerLevel operation which occurs before a multiplication gate at level l ∈ [2, . . . , L − 1]. We perform a worst case analysis and assume that the input ciphertexts are at level l − 1. We can then assume that the input to the tensoring operation in the previous multiplication gate (just after the previous SHE.LowerLevel ) was bounded by B, and so the output noise from the previous multiplication gate for each input ciphertext is bounded by B 2 + B Ks · q l /P + B Scale . This means the noise on entering the SHE.LowerLevel operation is bounded by ξ times this value, and so to maintain our invariant we require
Rearranging this into a quadratic equation in B we have
We denote the constant term in this equation by R l−1 . We now assume that all primes p l are of roughly the same size, and noting the we need to only satisfy the inequality for the largest modulus l = L − 1.
We now fix R L−2 by trying to ensure that R L−2 is close to
, and obtain
since
To ensure we have a solution we require
Recall that the final multiplication is executed in a different manner. We do not modulus switch before the multiplication, but afterwards. We analyse the implication of this, for the size of p 1 , from the point of view of our concrete application to our MPC protocol. The final multiplication will be of a ciphertext with noise
and a ciphertext with noise B (namely c 1 ). The input to the final key switch will have noise value approximately ξ · B 3 ; we make this simplifying assumption which makes little difference to the final values. The output noise from the keyswitch is then equal to
We then perform a modulus switch to obtain a ciphertext as output of the multiplication gate with noise bounded by ξ · B 3 + B Scale p 1 + B Ks · p 0 P + B Scale .
We again require this to be less than B, so we have now the cubic equation
Substituting in our existing estimate for P , namely 8 · ξ · B Ks · q L−2 /B Scale we find the inequality is roughly equivalent to, assuming L > 2 and
If we set B ≈ 2 · B Scale , then this means we have (approximately)
and so
will therefore guarantee the result.
We now need to estimate the size of p 0 . Due to the above choice of p 1 the ciphertext to which we apply the distributed decryption has norm bound by B, to which we add on a random encryption of zero at level L. To do this we need to apply LowerLevel to this encryption of zero, and hence the noise level of the ciphertext we finally pass into SHE.ShareDec in our main MPC protocol has noise bounded by B dec = 2 · B This means that we require
to ensure a valid distributed decryption.
Finally, set the Hamming weight h of the secret key sk to be 64 as in [27, 16] . Plugging this into our equations (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), we obtain
The largest modulus used in our key switching matrices, i.e. the largest modulus used in an LWE instance, is given by Q L−1 = P · q L−1 ; where using the above estimates we have
Recall from Appendix B.5 we have the following relationship between exp and our statistical security parameter sec; exp = sec + log 2 (N ). To ensure security we use the estimates of Lindner and Peikert [32] , we require at the κ-bit security level we require
D The UC Security Model
We work in the standard Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti [12] , with static corruption. The UC framework introduces a PPT environment Z that is invoked on the security parameter 1 κ and an auxiliary input z and oversees the execution of a protocol in one of the two worlds. The "ideal" world execution involves dummy parties P 1 , . . . , P n , an ideal adversary S who may corrupt some of the dummy parties, and a functionality F. The "real" world execution involves the PPT parties P 1 , . . . , P n and a real world adversary A who may corrupt some of the parties. In either of these two worlds, a PPT adversary can corrupt t parties out of the n parties. The environment Z chooses the input of the parties and may interact with the ideal/real adversary during the execution. At the end of the execution, it has to decide upon and output whether a real or an ideal world execution has taken place. We let IDEAL F ,S,Z (1 κ , z) denote the random variable describing the output of the environment Z after interacting with the ideal execution with adversary S, the functionality F, on the security parameter 1 κ and z. Let IDEAL F ,S,Z denote the ensemble {IDEAL F ,S,Z (1 κ , z)} κ∈N,z∈{0,1} * . Similarly let REAL Π,A,Z (1 κ , z) denote the random variable describing the output of the environment Z after interacting in a real execution of a protocol Π with adversary A, the parties P, on the security parameter 1 κ and z. Let REAL Π,A,Z denote the ensemble {REAL Π,A,Z (1 κ , z)} κ∈N,z∈{0,1} * .
Definition 3. For n ∈ N, let F be an n-ary functionality and let Π be an n-party protocol. We say that Π securely realizes F if for every PPT real world adversary A, there exists a PPT ideal world adversary S, corrupting the same parties, such that the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
We consider the above definition where it quantifies over different adversaries: passive or active, that corrupts only certain number of parties.
E Semi-honest Security
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem with respect to a generic L-levelled SHE scheme and first consider the correctness. Suppose in the protocol party P i has input x i ∈ F p . Then we claim the following invariant to hold for each wire w of the circuit C aug during the execution of the protocol: if (c, l) is the ciphertext associated with w during the execution of the protocol where level l ∈ [1, . . . , L], then SHE.Dec sk (c, l) = χ(z), where z ∈ F p is the value that would have been associated with w during the evaluation of C aug with input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Before proving the claim, we first recall that due to the introduction of the Refresh gates in C aug and the way circuit is evaluated, every wire in the circuit C aug has label in the range [1, . . . , L] and the corresponding ciphertext associated with the wire (during the protocol execution) has level in the range [1, . . . , L]. In addition the level of the ciphertext associated to a wire is equal to the label of the wire.
Our invariant is clearly true for the input wires. Assuming that the evaluation of the refresh gates is correct, the invariant is also true for the output of the Refresh gates. That the invariant holds for the rest of the circuit follows from the homomorphic property of the SHE scheme. Finally, the correctness of the refresh gate evaluation follows from the correctness of SHE.Pack, SHE.Unpack, the homomorphic of the underlying SHE; and the fact that all the ciphertexts that are used in evaluating a refresh gate have levels in the range [0, . . . , L].
We next prove the security. Let A be a real-world semi-honest adversary corrupting t < n parties and let T ⊂ P denote the set of corrupted parties. We now present an ideal-world adversary (simulator) S SH f for A in Figure 6 . The high level idea for the simulator is the following: the simulator takes the input {x i } P i ∈T and interacts with F f to obtain the function output y. The simulator then invokes A with the inputs {x i } P i ∈T and simulates each message that A would have received in the protocol Π SH f from the honest parties and from the functionality F SETUPGEN , stage by stage.
Let SHE be an L-levelled SHE scheme. The simulator plays the role of the honest parties and simulates each step of the protocol Π SH f as follows. The communication of the Z with the adversary A is handled as follows: Every input value received by the simulator from Z is written on A's input tape. Likewise, every output value written by A on its output tape is copied to the simulator's output tape (to be read by the environment Z). The simulator then does the following for the session ID sid:
-On receiving the message (sid, i) to FSETUPGEN from A for each Pi ∈ T , the simulator invokes (pk, ek, sk, dk1, . . . , dkn) = SHE.KeyGen(1 κ , 1 sec , n, t), computes (c0, 1) = SHE.LowerLevel ek (SHE.Enc pk (0, ·), 1), and on the behalf of FSETUPGEN sends (sid, pk, ek, {dki}P i ∈T , (c0, 1)) to A.
-For each Pj ∈ T , the simulator computes (cm jk , L) = SHE.Enc pk (m j,k , ·) for k ∈ [1, . . . , ζ] for a randomly chosen m j,k ∈ M and sends (sid, j, (cm j,1 , L), . . . , (cm j,ζ , L)) to A on the behalf of the honest parties. Online Computation:
-Input Stage: For every party Pj ∈ P \ T , the simulator computes a random encryption (cx j , 1) = SHE.LowerLevel ek (SHE.Enc pk (χ(0), ·), 1) and sends (sid, j, (cx j , 1)) to A on the behalf of every Pj ∈ P \ T . The simulator receives (sid, i, (cx i , 1)) from A and obtains the associated plaintext xi. On the behalf of the parties Pi ∈ T , the simulator sends (sid, i, xi) to the functionality F f and receives y, where xi = χ −1 (xi) ∈ Fp, -Computation Stage: The simulator performs the local computation (required for the addition, multiplication and refresh gates)
as specified in the protocol in order to be synchronized with the adversary with respect to the ciphertexts associated with the wires in the circuit. For the refresh gates, the simulator simulates to A the communication from the honest parties as follows:
• Refresh Gate: Let this be the kth refresh gate and let (cm k , L) be the kth offline ciphertext with the associated plaintext m k , which are known to the simulator while simulating the offline computation. Let (c, 0) be the ciphertext obtained after the masking operation. Since c1 is replaced by c0 in the simulation, c is associated with message m k . For each Pi ∈ T , on receiving (sid, i,μi) from A as the decryption shares of (c, 0), the simulator computes the simulated decryption shares {μ * j } P j ∈T = SHE.ShareSim((c, 0), m k , {μi}P i ∈T ). The simulator then sends the simulated shares {μ * j } P j ∈T to A as the decryption shares on the behalf of the honest parties. -Output Stage:
• Randomization: On receiving (sid, i, (ci, L)) for every Pi ∈ T from A, the simulator computes encryptions of χ(0) for every honest party, except for one honest party, say P h , it encrypts χ(y). The simulator sends these ciphertexts to A on the behalf of the honest parties and then follows the protocol steps to obtain (ĉ, 0) corresponding to the output wire. Note that the plaintext associated withĉ is χ(y), since c1 is replaced by c0 in the simulation and one of the ciphertexts on the behalf of an honest party (for randomization) encrypts χ(y).
• On receiving the decryption share (sid, i,γi) for every Pi ∈ T from A, the simulator computes the simulated decryption shares {γ * j } P j ∈P\T = SHE.ShareSim((ĉ, 0), χ(y), {γi}P i ∈T ) for the the honest parties Pj ∈ P \ T and sends (sid, j,γ * j ) as the decryption shares to A.
The simulator then outputs A's output. Thus we have proved the following claim that in turn concludes the theorem.
F Active Security
In this section we first discuss how to achieve a robust SHE.ShareCombine for our precise SHE scheme, then present a modified offline phase with linear communication overhead and then we go on to present the proof of Theorem 2.
F.1 Robust SHE.ShareCombine
Recall that in our concrete SHE scheme, the SHE.ShareCombine algorithm takes as input a set of shares obtained via Shamir Secret sharing over the ring R q 0 . From this observation it is clear, by the standard error correction properties of the Reed-Solomon codes (upon which the Shamir secret sharing is based), that one can obtain a robust SHE.ShareCombine algorithm immediately in the case of t < n/3. All that remains is to present a robust SHE.ShareCombine for the case t < n/2. We present the protocol (note that SHE.ShareCombine will be now a protocol instead of a local algorithm as it may involve interaction among the parties) in Figure 7 that uses the dispute-control framework proposed in [4] and the fact that Reed-Solomon codes can detect up to t < n/2 errors. The protocol also invokes the ZK functionality for the relation R sharedec a limited number of times for the proof of correct (distributed) decryption, where R sharedec is given below.
Unlike the functionality F R ZK defined in Figure 4 that treats all the parties in P as the verifiers, it is enough if the functionality for R sharedec is defined in a single prover and a single verifier settings. However we avoid elaborating more on this to keep simplicity.
Our robust SHE.ShareCombine realizes the following idea: For distributed decryption, as usual, every party sends the decryption shares to every other party. A party P i on receiving the decryption shares first check whether all of them lie on a unique polynomial of degree at most t (namely error detection). If no error is detected then the secret can be safely reconstructed. However if some error is detected then P i "complains" to the parties, asking them to prove the correctness of their respective decryption shares sent earlier; the parties respond back with ZK proofs by calling the F R sharedec ZK functionality. Now P i can "identify" the incorrect decryption share providers and ignore their shares in the future instances of distributed decryption. Each party P i keeps a list H i of the parties who it believes to be honest so far. Proper care has to be taken to ensure that the honest parties do not respond back "too many times" to the "false" complaints issued by the corrupted parties. This is resolved via keeping counters for the complaints. The idea is that an honest P j will complain to an honest P i at most t times and thus all the complaints from P j after tth complaint clearly indicates that the complaint is false and P j is corrupted. It is now easy to see that by using this trick, the total number of calls to F R sharedec ZK in the MPC protocol will be O(n 3 ), which is independent of the circuit size; this is because a party may have to provide ZK proof to another party (by calling F R sharedec ZK ) in at most t instances of distributed decryption. For large circuit sizes the extra communication cost to obtain a robust SHE.ShareCombine in the case n/3 ≤ t < n/2 can be safely ignored.
SHE.ShareCombine
Each party Pi maintains its local copy Hi of a list all the parties which it currently assumed to be honest. Initially each Hi = {P1, . . . , Pn}. Apart from this, every party Pi maintains n counters cnti,1, . . . , cnti,n, where cnti,j is used to maintain a count of number of times an error message has been received from the party Pj; initially all these counters are set to 0. To execute an SHE. ShareCombine((c, l) , {μj} j∈{1...,n} ) operation, whereμj has been sent by Pj, party Pi performs the following steps:
-Ignore allμj where Pj ∈ Hi. If the remainingμjs lie on a unique polynomial of degree at most t, then output the corresponding secret (namely the constant term of the polynomial). Otherwise, send a message (sid, i, Errori, (c, l)) to every party Pj ∈ Hi. -If an error message (sid, j, Errorj, (c, l)) has been received from some Pj ∈ Hi then check whether cnti,j < t. If cnti,j < t, then call F R sharedec ZK with the message (sid, i, j, (((c, l),μi), dki)) and set cnti,j := cnti,j + 1. Else if cnti,j ≥ t then remove Pj from the list Hi.
-If an error message (sid, i, Errori, (c, l)) has been sent in the first step, then execute the following: receive (sid, j, i, ((c, l),μj)) from F R sharedec ZK for every Pj ∈ Hi. If for some Pj ∈ Hi, the message (sid, j, i, ⊥) is received from F R sharedec ZK then remove Pj from Hi. Using theμjs corresponding to the Pj ∈ Hi, interpolate the polynomial of degree at most t, output its constant term as the secret. From the analysis in Section 6, we find that the online communication complexity of our protocol is Cost = O(n · |G M |) (in the asymptotic sense). We now sketch that how we can modify our offline computation so that asymptotically the communication complexity of the offline phase is O(n · ζ), where ζ > G R is the number of random ciphertexts generate in the offline phase. We need the following three tools:
-Multi-valued Broadcast with O(n) Overhead [25] : This protocol allows a sender Sen ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P n } to send a message m of size "identically" to all the n parties (even if Sen is corrupted). The protocol can tolerate upto t < n/2 faults (even if the adversary is computationally unbounded) and has communication complexity O(n ) provided = Ω(n 3 ). -Randomness Extraction [31, 18] : Given a set of n encryptions of random values t of which may be known to the adversary, the randomness extraction algorithm based on superinvertible matrix [31] or Vandermonde matrix [18] allows the parties to (locally) compute encryptions of (n − t) random values unknown to the adversary. -Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs: We require UC-secure instantiation of F Renc ZK , such that a party P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P n } on computing encryptions of random values can publicly prove to anyone that it knows the associated plaintexts by "attaching" a proof of size O( ). Such proofs can be obtained, for example using the techniques of [2] . Now the offline phase protocol will proceed as follows: every party P i computes encryptions of L random elements along with a NIZK proof that it knows the associated plaintexts where L = ζ (n−t) . Party P i then
Let SHE be a threshold L-levelled SHE scheme. The simulator plays the role of the honest parties and simulates each step of the protocol Π MAL f as follows. The communication of the Z with the adversary A is handled as follows: Every input value received by the simulator from Z is written on A's input tape. Likewise, every output value written by A on its output tape is copied to the simulator's output tape (to be read by the environment Z). The simulator then does the following for session ID sid:
Offline Computation:
-On receiving the message (sid, i) to FSETUPGEN from A for each Pi ∈ T , invoke (pk, ek, sk, dk1, . . . , dkn) = SHE.KeyGen(1 κ , n), compute (c0, 1) = SHE.LowerLevel ek (SHE.Enc pk (0, ·), 1), and send (sid, pk, ek, {dki}P i ∈T , (c0, 1)) to A. • For every party Pj ∈ P \ T , compute a random encryption (cx j , 1) = SHE.LowerLevel ek (SHE.Enc pk (χ(0), ·), 1) and send (sid, j, (cx j , 1)) to A on the behalf of F = SHE.LowerLevel ek (SHE.Enc pk (χ(xi), ri)) and send (sid, i, ⊥) to A if verification fails. Use publicly known ciphertext (cx i , 1) encrypting xi = χ(0) on the behalf of any such Pi.
• Send (sid, i, xi) to F f on the behalf of each Pi ∈ T and receive the function output y. -Computation Stage: The simulator acts in the same way as in S SH f except that whenever A sends the decryption shares corresponding to the parties in T during the evaluation of the refresh gates, the simulator ignores them; instead it computes the decryption shares by itself using the keys dki (for the distributed decryption) corresponding to Pi ∈ T (the simulator knows dki for every Pi ∈ T since it generated them by itself). These new decryption shares are then fed to SHE.ShareSim to obtain the simulated decryption shares corresponding to the honest parties, which the simulator then sends to A on behalf of the honest parties. -Output Stage:
• Randomization: Let H = P \ T be the set of honest parties and let P h be some party in H. For every Pj ∈ H \ {P h } compute a random encryption (cj, L) = SHE.Enc pk (0, ·), while for P h ∈ H compute a random encryption (c h , L) = SHE.Enc pk (χ(y), ·). For every Pj ∈ H, send (sid, j, (cj, L)) to A on the behalf of F Rzeroenc ZK .
• For each Pi ∈ T on receiving (sid, i, (ci, L), (0, r i )) as a message to F Rzeroenc ZK from A, verify if (ci, L) ? = SHE.Enc pk (0, r i ). If the verification fails for some Pi ∈ T then send (sid, i, ⊥) to A and consider a publicly known level L encryption of 0 as (ci, L) for such a Pi.
• On receiving the decryption shares from A corresponding to the parties Pi ∈ T , the simulator ignores them and instead recomputes them using the dkis and feed them to SHE.ShareSim to compute the simulated decryption shares for the honest parties. Finally it sends the simulated shares to A on behalf of the honest parties.
The simulator then outputs A's output. Fig. 8 . Simulator for the active adversary A corrupting t parties in the set T ⊂ P.
